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Conventional wisdom says that, in the absence of default penalties, sovereign
risk destroys all foreign asset trade. We show that this conventional wisdom
rests on one implicit assumption: that assets cannot be retraded in secondary
markets. Without this assumption, foreign asset trade is possible even in the ab-
sence of default penalties. This result suggests a broader perspective regarding
the origins of sovereign risk and its remedies. Sovereign risk affects foreign as-
set trade only if default penalties are insufﬁcient and secondary markets work
imperfectly. To reduce its effects, one can either increase default penalties or
improve the working of secondary markets.
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Conventional wisdom views the problem of sovereign risk as one of insufﬁcient penalties.
Foreign creditors can only be repaid if the government enforces foreign debts. And this will only
happen if foreign creditors can effectively use the threat of imposing penalties to the country.
Guided by this assessment of the problem, policy prescriptions to reduce sovereign risk have
focused on providing incentives for governments to enforce foreign debts. For instance, countries
might want to favor increased trade ties and other forms of foreign dependence that make them
vulnerable to foreign retaliation thereby increasing the costs of default penalties.
This paper presents an unconventional view of the problem of sovereign risk as one of miss-
ing or imperfect secondary markets. In our setup foreign creditors cannot impose penalties and
therefore the government never enforces foreign debts. But foreign creditors can still be repaid
by selling their debts in secondary markets. This alternative view of the problem gives rise to
a new and different set of policy prescriptions aimed at improving the workings of secondary
markets. For instance, countries might want to develop deep secondary markets abroad to reduce
their government’s ability to intervene in them.
To understand this view of sovereign risk, consider the canonical situation of a country that
borrowed in the past and is considering whether to pay back to its foreign creditors. It does not
matter whether it was the private sector or the government who borrowed initially. After all,
even government debts must ultimately be paid by taxing the private sector. The last word on
whether the country pays its foreign debt must come from the country’s government however,
since nobody else holds enough power to force the private sector to pay. The problem, of course,
is that the government cares more about the private sector than about foreign creditors and ﬁnds
it tempting not to enforce foreign debts. What prevents this? Conventional wisdom says that
only the expectation of costly default penalties, such as the loss of collateral and reputation, trade
embargoes or even military interventions. If these penalties turn out to be insufﬁcient, the country
will default on its debt and start a process of renegotiation. Eventually, some sort of explicit or
implicit agreement will be reached and the country will be able to borrow again.
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This conventional wisdom does not consider however the possibility that foreign creditors sell
their debts in the secondary market, and this is far from an innocuous oversight. Once it becomes
known that penalties are insufﬁcient and default is looming, foreign creditors will not passively
hold their debts until default takes place. Instead, they will try to sell them in secondary markets
and recover any value they can. Who will buy these debts? Certainly not other foreign creditors.
But the private sector will, if it expects the government to enforce domestic debts. We show
that, indeed, the private sector buys back the debts at face value and domestic debts are enforced.
Trading in secondary markets therefore allows foreign creditors to successfully circumvent the
opportunistic behavior of the government, ‘de facto’ averting default and therefore eliminating
sovereign risk. The proof of this result is based on two observations: (i) once the private sector
has bought back the debt, not enforcing domestic debts can at most redistribute wealth within
the private sector but cannot increase its level of wealth; and (ii) trading in the secondary market
always ensures that the redistribution that would result from not enforcing domestic debts is
undesirable for the government.
A useful way to think about this result is that secondary markets create a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’
situation that forces the country to buy back or repay its debt. It would be better for the different
members of the private sector to coordinate actions and not to purchase each other’s debts from
foreign creditors. If such collusion were possible, it would lead to default and therefore to an
increase in the wealth of the country. But the capital gains or proﬁts from violating the agreement
would be large, since individuals could purchase the country’s foreign debt at a discount and
redeem it later at face value. Hence, the agreement is not feasible and the country as a whole
ends up repurchasing all of its foreign debt in the secondary market. This outcome constitutes an
‘ex-post’ inefﬁciency from the viewpoint of the country because it leads to higher repayment, but
for the same reason it raises ‘ex-ante’ efﬁciency by allowing the country to borrow more.
The result that secondary markets eliminate sovereign risk constitutes a valuable theoretical
benchmark. We derive it ﬁrst in Section I using a simple two-period, two-region setup so as to
develop the basic intuitions in a transparent way. We derive this result again in Section II using
a quite general setup with many regions, many periods, many shocks, many sources of market
incompleteness, and many sources of heterogeneity within and between regions. This detailed
derivation is useful because it shows which assumptions are crucial, and which ones are not. For
instance, we ﬁnd that the result does not depend on governments being benevolent, the nature
of shocks or markets being complete. All the crucial assumptions directly relate to the workings
of secondary markets. Whatever assets exist, it should be possible to retrade them in secondary
markets that are competitive and free from government intervention and other trading frictions.
Of course, these requirements are somewhat unrealistic. Transaction costs, large agents, and
many forms of government interference typically impair the workings of real-world secondary
markets. Under these circumstances, the problem of sovereign risk resurfaces. In Section III,
we analyze the effects of these frictions and ﬁnd that the picture that emerges from the theory
is surprisingly rich. When penalties are known to be insufﬁcient, foreign creditors try to sell
their debts, perhaps at a discount, and ‘leave’ the country. The private sector is willing to buy
back these debts if it expects the government to enforce them. The government, in turn, tries to
avoid these repurchases by threatening not to enforce, by imposing capital controls and, more
generally, by taking a variety of actions intended to put sand on the wheels of secondary markets.
If the government is unsuccessful, default is averted. If the government is successful, default
takes place and the debt renegotiation process starts. Either way, insufﬁcient penalties start a
period of market turbulence which can be usefully understood as a costly struggle among foreign
creditors, the private sector, and the government. Existing research, which ignores the role of
secondary markets, cannot capture this rich set of interactions. And yet, as we discuss in Section
IV, these interactions generate a number of predictions that are consistent with stylized evidence
on emerging-market borrowing.
A caveat is in order. Throughout the paper, we study setups where there are no default penal-VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE SOVEREIGN RISK AND SECONDARY MARKETS 3
ties. This research strategy allows us to clearly isolate the role of secondary markets and their
effects. Moreover, in the course of our research it has become apparent that the interactions
between secondary markets and default penalties are far from trivial and deserve a separate treat-
ment. Nonetheless, the results presented in this paper suggest a broader perspective regarding the
origins of sovereign risk and its remedies. Sovereign risk affects foreign asset trade only if both,
default penalties are insufﬁcient and secondary markets work imperfectly. To reduce the effects
of sovereign risk, one can either increase default penalties or improve the workings of secondary
markets.
Related literature:
There is an extensive theoretical literature that studies the role of reputational considerations
and direct sanctions in foreign asset trade.1;2 The empirical relevance of these penalties, however,
is still under debate.3 Without exception, this literature has ignored the role of secondary markets
and taken for granted that, if governments do not enforce and/or make payments to foreigners,
then foreigners cannot collect on their debts.4 This was somewhat justiﬁed when the literature
started in the early 1980’s, since virtually all emerging market borrowing was done via syndicated
bank loans which were difﬁcult to retrade. However, the institutional setup of emerging-market
borrowing has changed dramatically since then: a large fraction of both government and private
borrowing is now done by selling bonds and stocks which are traded in deep secondary markets.
This paper is also related to a strand of the literature that asks whether it is optimal for a
country that suffers a debt overhang to repurchase its foreign debt before maturity.5 This question
is answered from an ex-post perspective in which the amount of outstanding debt is exogenous
to the analysis. We instead focus on debt repurchases when there is no debt overhang and the
amount of outstanding debt is endogenous to the analysis. In our context, these repurchases are
clearly suboptimal from an ex-post perspective since they lead to the country paying back its debt
even when there are no penalties for not doing so. Nonetheless, these repurchases take place in
equilibrium and are beneﬁcial from an ex-ante perspective since they allow the country to borrow
more in the ﬁrst place.6
I. The basic argument
The main result of this paper is that, if secondary markets work perfectly, sovereign risk has no
effects. More precisely, it makes no difference for consumption and welfare whether we assume
that all asset payments are enforced or, alternatively, we assume that governments strategically
choose which ones, if any, to enforce. This result applies to a very broad class of models, as we
1See Jonathan Eaton and Mark Gersovitz (1981), Herschel I. Grossman and John B. Van Huyck (1988), Jeremy
Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff (1989a, b), Raquel Fernández and Robert W. Rosenthal (1990), Andrew Atkeson (1991),
Harold L. Cole, James Dow, and William B. English (1995), Cole and Patrick J. Kehoe (1997), Kenneth M. Kletzer and
Brian D. Wright (2000), Kehoe and Fabrizio Perri (2002), Mark L. Wright (2002), Manuel Amador (2008), and Guido
Sandleris (2008). See Eaton and Fernández (1995) for an excellent survey.
2There is also a more applied literature that focuses on the quantitative effects of debt crises on asset trade and
business cycles. See, for instance, Kraay et al. (2005), Mark Aguiar and Gita Gopinath (2006, 2007), Vivian Z. Yue
(2006), Cristina Arellano (2008), and Enrique G. Mendoza and Yue (2008).
3For evidence on the length of exclusion from international capital markets after defaults, see Gaston Gelos, Ratna
Sahay, and Sandleris (2004) and Rohan Pitchford and Wright (2007). For evidence on the existence of trade disruptions
around times of default, see Andrew K. Rose (2005) and Jose V. Martinez and Sandleris (2007).
4Three recent papers examine the role of secondary markets after default, during debt renegotiations. See Sergi Lanau
(2007), Pitchford and Wright (2008), and Yan Bai and Jing Zhang (2009).
5See Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1991), Michael P. Dooley (1988), Kenneth Froot (1989), Elhanan Helpman (1989),
Paul R. Krugman (1989, 1992), Jeffrey D. Sachs (1990), Peter B. Kenen (1991), Julio J. Rotemberg (1991), Enrica
Detragiache (1994), Ishac Diwan and Mark M. Spiegel (1994), and Jorge Fernández-Ruiz (2000).
6From a more general perspective, this paper is also related to the work of Alberto Bisin and Adriano A. Rampini
(2006), who explore the role of hidden trades in disciplining governments.4 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
formally prove in Section II. In this section, we prove the result in a simple setup so as to develop
intuition.
A. A barebones model of sovereign risk
This section presents one of the simplest worlds in which we can prove our result. We label it
the Debtor-Creditor World (D-C World) and it is as follows:
EXAMPLE 1 (Debtor-Creditor World): The world lasts two periods: Today and Tomorrow, in-
dexed by t 2 f0;1g; and it contains two equal-sized regions: Debtor and Creditor, indexed by
j 2 fD;Cg. Let I j be the set of individuals located in region j, and IW D ID [ IC. Each
region contains a continuum of inﬁnitesimal individuals that maximize this separable utility func-
tion: U.ci0;ci1/ D u.ci0/ C u.ci1/ for all i 2 IW; where ci0 and ci1 are used, respectively, to
denote the consumption levels of individual i Today and Tomorrow, and u.￿/ is monotonic, in-
creasing and concave. All debtors (i.e. residents of Debtor) receive an endowment equal to y ￿"
Today and y C" Tomorrow. All creditors (i.e. residents of Creditor) receive an endowment equal
to y C " Today and y ￿ " Tomorrow.
In the D-C World there are no gains from domestic trade because all individuals within a
region have the same preferences and endowments. But endowments differ across regions and
this creates gains from international trade in bonds. To reap these gains, the world needs well-
functioning bond markets. We refer to the bond markets that open Today and Tomorrow as
primary and secondary respectively. For these markets to work well, bond payments must be
enforced. This is the role of governments.
There are two governments, one in each region, whose only action is to enforce payments by
their residents. In doing so, governments can discriminate between payments owed to residents
of their own region and to residents of the other region.7 Governments are assumed to have no
credibility so that any promise made before the time of enforcement is discounted by individuals.
We consider two alternative institutional setups regarding enforcement:
￿ We shall say that there is full enforcement if the world has institutions ensuring that gov-
ernments always prefer to enforce bond payments regardless of the parties involved.
￿ We shall, instead, say that there is strategic enforcement if governments choose which bond
payments, if any, to enforce in order to maximize the average utility of their residents, i.e.
W j D
R
i2I j u.ci1/ for all j 2 fD;Cg.
Thus, the only difference between these setups is whether –at the time of enforcement– gov-














t = 0 t = 1
7This assumption is only made for simplicity and none of our results depend on it.
8An equivalent timing assumption would be that both primary and secondary markets are always open. For simplicity
and without loss of generality, we assume that they are open only when there are gains from trade. In Section D we
analyze the possibility that secondary markets be closed even if there are gains from trade as a result of capital controls.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE SOVEREIGN RISK AND SECONDARY MARKETS 5
An equilibrium of the D-C World is characterized by both individual and government max-
imization. Under full enforcement, individuals trade in primary and secondary markets given
their knowledge that governments always choose to enforce all payments. Under strategic en-
forcement, individuals trade in primary and secondary markets given their expectations on en-
forcement. Governments, in turn, choose enforcement after individuals have traded in secondary
markets. Naturally, individuals are rational and their expectations on enforcement must be correct
in equilibrium.9
B. Full enforcement
If governments always enforce all payments, bond prices in secondary markets must equal
their face value. If prices were below face value, individuals could make a riskless proﬁt by
purchasing bonds and redeeming them. If prices were above face value, the opposite strategy
would then deliver a riskless proﬁt. In primary markets, bonds must promise a return of one
given the strong symmetry between periods: there is no time preference for consumption and the





1/￿ D 1 for all j 2 fD;Cg,
where q
j
t is the price in period t of a bond issued by a resident of region j that pays one unit
of output Tomorrow, and the asterisk is used to denote the full-enforcement equilibrium. Since
bond returns are one, we have the following equilibrium consumption:
(2) .ci0/￿ D .ci1/￿ D y for all i 2 IW.
That is, individuals completely smooth their consumption across periods.
Implementing the full enforcement consumption allocation requires debtors to borrow from
creditors. Let x
j
it be the bonds issued by residents of region j that are held by individual i after
trading in period t. There are many possible distributions of bond holdings in the primary market
that support the consumption allocation in Equation (2), given the prices in Equation (1). Among
them, it is customary to choose the distribution that minimizes trade volume:10
(3) .xC
i0/￿ D 0 for all i 2 IW and .xD
i0/￿ D
￿
￿" if i 2 ID
C" if i 2 IC
Equation (3) states that debtors issue " bonds and sell them to creditors. There are even more
distributions of bond holdings in the secondary market that support the consumption allocation
in Equation (2), given the prices in Equation (1). In fact, any redistribution of the original bonds
achieves this since all individuals can directly collect any bond payment under full enforcement.
It is again customary to choose among all of these distributions the one that minimizes trade





i0/￿ for all j 2 fD;Cg, i 2 IW.
Note that creditors do not go to the secondary market but instead collect their debts directly
9Our concept of equilibrium is the same as in V. V. Chari, Kehoe, and Edward C. Prescott (1989). Namely, indi-
viduals behave competitively and take prices and (enforcement) policy as given. Governments, in turn, conduct their
(enforcement) policy strategically. In addition, and for clarity of exposition, we rule out the use of mixed strategies by
governments. None of our results depend on this assumption.
10Minimization of trade volume implies that gross and net bond holdings coincide and are both given by x
j
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from the original bond issuers. Therefore, the secondary market plays no role under full enforce-
ment and closing it would have no effects on consumption and welfare. To sum up, Equations
(1), (2), (3) and (4) provide a complete description of the full-enforcement equilibrium.
Under full enforcement, regional governments are assumed to have both the means and the
will to force domestic residents to pay their debts. Under strategic enforcement, governments are
still assumed to have the means to enforce debts but they might not have the will to do so. In this
last case, it is widely believed that international trade in bonds is not possible in the D-C World
since there are no default penalties. The argument goes as follows: creditors lend Today only
if they expect debtors to pay their debts Tomorrow. But Tomorrow Debtor’s government will
not force debtors to pay back their debts since this would lower the average utility of the region.
Anticipating this, creditors do not lend Today. There is therefore a unique equilibrium without
international trade in bonds in which each region (and therefore each individual) consumes its
own endowment. We show next why this conclusion is incorrect.
C. The role of secondary markets
It is evident that, under strategic enforcement, Tomorrow Debtor’s government will not enforce
payments on bonds held by creditors. It is also evident that creditors must anticipate this Today.
But it does not follow that creditors do not lend Today since they still have the option of reselling
their bonds Tomorrow in the secondary market. In fact, we show next that in equilibrium bonds
trade in the secondary market at face value. Anticipating this, creditors lend to debtors Today and
all gains from trade are reaped even if governments choose enforcement strategically.
Deﬁne e
j
j0 2 f0;1g to be a variable that takes the value one if bond payments from residents of
region j to those of j0 are enforced, and zero otherwise. Under full enforcement, we have that
e
j
j0 D 1 for all j and j0 by assumption. Under strategic enforcement, e
j
j0 is obtained as part of
the equilibrium and must be consistent with government preferences and bond holdings after the
secondary market closes. For instance, assume prices, consumptions and bond holdings are those
of the equilibrium with full enforcement. Since all bonds are in the hands of creditors after the
secondary market closes, this is possible in an equilibrium with strategic enforcement if and only
if Debtor’s government prefers to enforce bond payments to creditors. But this cannot be since
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As a result, Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) cannot all simultaneously be part of an equilibrium
with strategic enforcement.
This does not mean however that consumption and welfare differ between the cases with full
and strategic enforcement. Let a double asterisk denote an equilibrium with strategic enforce-
ment. Assume that Debtor’s government is expected to enforce bond payments between debtors.






1/￿￿ D 1 for all j 2 fD;Cg,
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(7) .xC
i0/￿￿ D 0 for all i 2 IW and .xD
i0/￿￿ D
￿
￿" if i 2 ID,
C" if i 2 IC.
Instead of assuming no trade in the secondary market, though, assume that trade in this market
leads to the following distribution of bond holdings:
(8) .xC
i1/￿￿ D 0 for all i 2 IW and .xD
i1/￿￿ D
￿
￿i if i 2 ID,
0 if i 2 IC,
with
R
i2ID ￿i D 0 and ￿i ￿ y for all i 2 ID.11 That is, in secondary markets debtors purchase
all the bonds from creditors although not necessarily in a symmetric way. In turn, assume that
Debtor’s government enforces payments between debtors:
(9) .eD
D/￿￿ D 1.
The distribution in Equation (8) and the enforcement policy in Equation (9) are consistent
with maximization by both individuals and governments. If Debtor’s government is expected
to enforce bond payments between debtors, the distribution of bond holdings in Equation (8) is
consistent with individual maximization since all bonds are in the hands of those (i.e. debtors)
capable of redeeming them after the market closes. Otherwise, there would be unexploited trade
opportunities as those that cannot collect bond payments would not be selling their bonds to those
that can. If individuals choose the distribution of bond holdings in Equation (8), enforcement of
bond payments between debtors is consistent with Debtor’s government maximization. Jensen’s













Therefore, we have shown that Equations (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) constitute an equilibrium with
strategic enforcement.
Consumption and welfare are the same in the equilibria with strategic and full enforcement.
The only difference is the amount of trade in the secondary market. In both equilibria, trading
in secondary markets must ensure that all bonds end up in the hands of those individuals that
can collect payments from bond issuers. Since this is an empty requirement in the case of full
enforcement, minimization of trade volume then leads to zero trade. But this is not an empty
requirement with strategic enforcement. Since creditors hold all the bonds and Debtor’s govern-
ment never enforces bond payments to them, trade in the secondary market is needed to ensure
that all bonds end up in the hands of debtors. It is easy to check that there are many distributions
of bond holdings that fulﬁll this requirement.
Secondarymarketsplaytheusualroleoftransferringassetstothoseindividualsthatvaluethem
most, leading to maximization of asset value. This means moving bonds from those individuals
that cannot collect payments from the original issuers to those that can, leading to maximization
of enforcement. Creditors are willing to sell all their bonds at any positive price since they know
thatanybondleftintheirhandsafterthemarketcloseswillnotbeenforced. Therefore, thesupply
ofbondsisvertical.Debtorsarewillingtobuyanyquantityofbondsatfacevaluesincetheyknow
that bonds left in their hands after the market closes will be enforced. That is, the demand for
bonds is horizontal until all the endowment of Debtor has been exhausted, and downward-sloping
11This distribution is feasible since the secondary market clears and no individual is left with a negative endowment
after trading in it.8 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
thereafter. The equilibrium price is therefore equal to face value if demand and supply cross in
the horizontal section of the demand curve. But this must be the case since the face value of all
outstanding bonds cannot exceed Debtor’s output. Otherwise, we would reach the contradiction
that the allocation with full enforcement implies negative consumption for debtors.
Another useful and intuitive way of thinking about the role of secondary markets is that they
create a prisoner’s dilemma situation that forces the region to repurchase or repay its debt. Once
Tomorrow arrives, it would be better for all debtors to agree not to purchase each other’s bonds
from creditors. If such collusion were possible, it would lead to default and therefore an increase
in consumption for all debtors. But each debtor has a strong incentive to depart from such an
agreement. Since creditors are willing to sell their bonds at any positive price, the capital gains
or proﬁts from violating the agreement would be enormous for a small or inﬁnitesimal debtor.
Hence, theagreementisnotfeasibleandtheregionasawholeendsuppayingallofitsdebtsinthe
secondary market. This outcome, which constitutes an ex-post inefﬁciency from the viewpoint
of the region, somewhat paradoxically ensures ex-ante efﬁciency since it allows for international
trade in bonds Today.
The widespread belief that the absence of default penalties alone leads to a unique equilibrium
without international trade is thus incorrect. This requires the absence of both default penalties
and secondary markets. Closing secondary markets does not make any difference with full en-
forcement, since creditors have the additional option of directly collecting debts from debtors.
But closing secondary markets has dramatic effects with strategic enforcement, since creditors
do not have this additional option available to them. Once these markets are closed, creditors lose
any hope of being repaid and decide not to lend to debtors. As a result, each region (and therefore
each individual) ends up consuming its own endowment. With secondary markets, government
attempts to use enforcement policy to redistribute from foreign to domestic residents are easily
circumvented with the help of additional trading and without creating any welfare loss. Without
secondary markets, government attempts to use enforcement policy to redistribute from foreign
to domestic residents are also futile. But they destroy valuable international trade and create
welfare losses.
To sum up, the equilibrium with strategic enforcement delivers the same consumption and wel-
fare than the equilibrium with full enforcement, but requires more trade in secondary markets.
This additional trade is however only the ﬁrst consequence of moving from full to strategic en-
forcement. The observant reader has already noticed a second one, namely, that consumption and
welfare are unique with full enforcement but not with strategic enforcement. Our analysis of the
deceptively simple D-C World is not over yet.12
D. Multiple equilibria and welfare
The equilibrium with strategic enforcement described in the previous section is based on the
‘optimistic’ expectations that Debtor’s government will enforce bond payments between debtors.
These expectations are validated in equilibrium since trading in the secondary market results in
a distribution of bond holdings such that Debtor’s government chooses to enforce payments on
all outstanding bonds. What would happen instead if individuals have ‘pessimistic’ expectations
about enforcement? We show next that it is also possible to construct equilibria based on various
combinations of optimistic and pessimistic expectations on enforcement.
Assume individuals are pessimistic and expect Debtor’s government not to enforce any bond
payments. Then, there will be no demand in the secondary market and any bond traded there will
12The equilibrium with full enforcement is unique with respect to consumption and welfare in the D-C World. But this
need not be true in other worlds. We shall show later that for each (of the possibly many) equilibrium with full enforce-
ment, there always exists a corresponding equilibrium with strategic enforcement that delivers the same consumption and
welfare. What we analyze next is a set of additional equilibria with strategic enforcement that do not correspond to any
equilibrium with full enforcement.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE SOVEREIGN RISK AND SECONDARY MARKETS 9
command a zero price. Anticipating this, the price of bonds in the primary market is also zero,
no bonds are issued, and each region ends up consuming its own endowment.13 To conclude
that this is an equilibrium, we must show that the pessimistic expectations on enforcement are
consistent with Debtor’s government maximization. But this must be the case here. Since no
bonds are issued Today, Debtor’s government is indifferent between enforcing and not enforcing
payments Tomorrow and, thus, not enforcing is indeed a best response. Therefore, we have found
an additional equilibrium with different consumption and welfare from those in the equilibrium
with full enforcement.14
It is easy to show that there are no additional equilibria in our simple world.15 The reason
is that there is only one meaningful enforcement decision Tomorrow, namely, whether Debtor’s
government enforces bond payments between debtors. This is only because we have assumed
that governments cannot make different enforcement decisions for different groups of residents.
But this assumption was just adopted for convenience. Relaxing it generates additional equilibria
with strategic enforcement with different levels of consumption and welfare based on different
combinations of optimistic and pessimistic expectations. The following example makes this point
forcefully.
EXAMPLE 2 (D-C World with Names): All assumptions are the same as in the D-C World, ex-
cept that individuals are also given one of two possible names: ‘Dupont’ or ‘Dupond’.
Although Duponts and Duponds have the same preferences and endowments, their different
names allow governments to discriminate between them when deciding enforcement. This is
clearly a minimal departure from the world of the previous section. But it forces Debtor’s govern-
ment to make another meaningful enforcement decision Tomorrow and this creates two additional
equilibria. For instance, assume that individuals expect Debtor’s government to enforce bonds
issued by Duponts and held by other debtors, but not to enforce any bonds issued by Duponds.
Given these expectations, Duponts can borrow while Duponds cannot and are therefore forced
to consume their own endowment. Bond returns are less than one and all individuals, except
for credit-constrained Duponds, equalize the ratio of their marginal utilities Today and Tomor-
row. Duponts are better off than in the optimistic equilibrium since the removal of competitors
(i.e. Duponds) from the primary market improves the terms at which they can borrow. But both
Duponds and creditors are worse off than in the optimistic equilibrium, the former because they
cannot borrow and the latter because they lend at worse terms.16
Under strategic enforcement there is always an optimistic equilibrium with the same consump-
tion and welfare than under full enforcement. But we have seen that there are other pessimistic
equilibria too. In the previous examples, these pessimistic equilibria never lead to a Pareto im-
provement over full enforcement. But this need not always be the case, as the following example
shows:
13As in any situation in which there is a useless asset which has price zero, individuals are indifferent between trading
or not. Strictly speaking, in the pessimistic equilibrium, asset holdings are thus indeterminate. We are implicitly adopting
the convention that useless assets are not traded in equilibrium.
14This pessimistic equilibrium is not the same as the equilibrium with missing secondary markets that the previous
literature has focused upon. Pessimism closes the bond market and eliminates all trade, domestic and foreign. Closing
secondary markets geographically segments the bond market eliminating international trade but not domestic trade. This
difference is obscured in the D-C World because all individuals within a region are identical and there is no domestic
trade in equilibrium.
15This would not be true if Debtor’s government could randomize between enforcement and nonenforcement. In this
case, there would be a continuum of equilibria in mixed strategies. In the D-C World all of these equilibria would deliver
the same consumption and welfare as the optimistic equilibrium.
16To check that this is an equilibrium simply note that all expectations on enforcement are consistent with ex-post
government optimization. Naturally, there is another equilibrium in which it is Duponds who can borrow while Duponts
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EXAMPLE 3 (Lucky-Unlucky World): The world lasts two periods: Today and Tomorrow, in-
dexed by t 2 f0;1g; and it contains two equal-sized regions: Home and Foreign, indexed by
j 2 fH; Fg. Each region contains a continuum of inﬁnitesimal individuals that maximize the
already familiar utility function: U.ci0;ci1/ D u.ci0/ C u.ci1/ for all i 2 IW D IH [ IF. All
individuals receive an endowment of y Today. But Tomorrow there are two states. If s D sH,
Home is lucky and its residents receive an endowment equal to y C ", while Foreign is unlucky
and its residents receive an endowment equal to y ￿ ". If s D sF, Home is unlucky and its
residents receive an endowment equal to y ￿ ", while Foreign is lucky and its residents receive
an endowment equal to y C ". Both states have equal probability.
Clearly there are gains from international risk sharing in the Lucky-Unlucky World (L-U
World). By pooling their endowments, individuals could eliminate the volatility of their con-
sumption at no cost in terms of mean consumption. But we shall consider a situation in which
insurance markets are missing. The only asset that can be traded is a noncontingent bond. Un-
der full enforcement there is no international trade and each region is forced to consume its own
endowment. The same happens under strategic enforcement if expectations are optimistic. This
outcome is not Pareto efﬁcient and the reason, of course, is that markets are incomplete.
But there is another equilibrium with a mix of optimistic and pessimistic expectations that can
raise the welfare of all and lead to Pareto efﬁciency. Assume that individuals expect the lucky
region to enforce bond payments between its residents, and the unlucky region not do so. Given
these expectations, there is a trading strategy that ensures full risk sharing: in the primary market
each individual buys " bonds issued by residents of the other region and ﬁnances this sale by
issuing and selling " bonds. If an individual turns out to be unlucky, he/she will default on his/her
bonds and enjoy a consumption equal to y. If an individual turns out to be lucky, he/she will have
a capital loss equal to " and enjoy a consumption equal to y as well.
What is going on? Pessimism closes markets (such as those for Dupond bonds) and/or leads
to equilibrium default (such as when a region turns out to be unlucky). In the D-C World markets
are complete and, as a result, the allocation with full enforcement is Pareto efﬁcient. In this
ﬁrst-best context, closing markets and/or inducing defaults always reduces welfare. In the L-
U World insurance markets are missing and the allocation with full enforcement is no longer
Pareto efﬁcient. In this second-best context, it is well known that closing some markets and/or
using defaults to change the span of existing assets might lead to Pareto superior outcomes.
This classic second-best intuition explains why pessimistic expectations might sometimes lead to
higher welfare than optimistic ones.17
Up to this point we have shown that: (i) there is always an optimistic equilibrium that delivers
the same level of consumption and welfare as the equilibrium with full enforcement; (ii) there
are additional equilibria with strategic enforcement that are characterized by pessimistic expec-
tations on enforcement and entail different levels of consumption and welfare; (iii) the optimistic
equilibrium need not be the one that delivers the highest possible welfare. The next topic we
address is robustness.
E. Robustness
In order to assess the robustness of the equilibria that exist with strategic enforcement, we
introduce a slight modiﬁcation to the environment. We do so by adding a small preference for
enforcement. Assume governments suffer a small welfare loss equal to b every time they decide
not to enforce payments. We shall think of b as being arbitrarily small but strictly positive. In par-
ticular, in the D-C World this implies that the objective function of Debtor’s government is now
17This example also shows that our results do not depend on assuming that markets are complete. The optimistic
equilibrium with strategic enforcement replicates the consumption and welfare of the equilibrium with full enforcement
regardless of whether the latter is Pareto efﬁcient or not.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE SOVEREIGN RISK AND SECONDARY MARKETS 11
given by W D D
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. This small modiﬁcation to our environment
eliminates all equilibria based on pessimistic expectations and, thus, the optimistic equilibrium is
the only one which is robust.
The reason behind this result is quite simple. If individuals expect Debtor’s government not to
enforce any bond payments Tomorrow, no bonds issued by debtors will be traded today. At the
time of making an enforcement decision, then, Debtor’s government ﬁnds that it has no payments
to enforce. Without a preference for enforcement, i.e. b D 0, this implies that the government
is indifferent between enforcement and nonenforcement and the latter is thus a best response.
With a small preference for enforcement, i.e. b > 0, this is no longer the case: whenever the
enforcement decision has no effect on consumption or welfare, the government will choose to
enforce payments ex-post, and nonenforcement can therefore not occur in equilibrium.
We therefore add a fourth and ﬁnal item to our list of results: (iv) only the optimistic equilib-
rium survives the introduction of an (arbitrarily small) preference for enforcement.18 This leads
us to select the optimistic equilibrium for the D-C World. We then refer to the differences be-
tween this equilibrium and the equilibrium with full enforcement as the effects of sovereign risk.
Our main result is that, if individuals can freely retrade existing assets, sovereign risk has no
effects on consumption and welfare. The only effect of sovereign risk is to increase trade volume
as individuals trade not only to smooth their consumption but also to circumvent the strategic or
opportunistic behavior of governments.
F. Commitment and enforcement
We end this section by calling the reader’s attention to a subtle but important issue. Up to now,
we have shown that secondary markets are able to restore the allocation with full enforcement
when governments have no commitment and choose enforcement strategically. This situation is
often referred to as ‘discretion’ in the time-inconsistency literature. Some readers might have
wondered why, instead of referring to an economy with full enforcement, we have not used the
more common terminology of an economy in which governments have commitment. Would
these two alternatives not be fundamentally the same? In this section we explain why they are
not.
The widespread notion that commitment leads to full enforcement is based, we think, on the
prevalence of models with complete markets and representative agents. When markets are in-
complete, commitment does not in general lead to full enforcement. Consider, for instance, the
L-U World of Example 3, in which each region contains a representative individual but markets
are incomplete due to the absence of contingent bonds. As we argued in Section 1.4, in this world
the allocation with full enforcement is inefﬁcient. In fact, full enforcement renders the available
assets useless. If Home and Foreign had commitment, they would agree Today on the following
enforcement policy: the lucky region enforces all bond payments, while the unlucky region en-
forces none. This pattern of enforcement would increase the span of noncontingent bonds and
lead to higher ex-ante expected utility for all individuals in the world. As a result, in this world
commitment would raise welfare by preventing secondary markets from leading to the allocation
with full enforcement. This is therefore a world in which discretion delivers the allocation with
full enforcement, but commitment does not.19
When agents are heterogeneous, commitment need not lead to full enforcement either. Con-
18The optimistic equilibrium is also robust to the introduction of a small cost of enforcement, i.e. b < 0. This
follows from the fact that, in all optimistic equilibria in which there is inequality in debtor bond holdings after trade in
the secondary market, enforcement is strictly preferred by the government of Debtor. Of course, pessimistic equilibria
are also robust to the introduction of enforcement costs.
19Note that this equilibrium is observationally equivalent to the equilibrium with a mix of optimistic and pessimistic
expectations that we studied in Section 1.4. Without commitment, we showed that this equilibrium was neither unique
nor robust. With commitment, this equilibrium is both unique and robust.12 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
sider, forinstance, theD-CWorldwithNamesofExample2butassumethatDebtor’sgovernment
only cares about Duponts, i.e. W D D
R
i2ID ￿i ￿ u.ci1/ with ￿i D 1 if i is a Dupont and ￿i ￿ 0
if i is a Dupond. In this world markets are complete but there is heterogeneity within the Debtor
region. If Debtor’s government had commitment, it would choose to enforce bond payments by
Duponts and not to enforce bond payments by Duponds. This would effectively remove Duponds
fromtheprimarymarket, loweringthesupplyofbondsandimprovingthetermsatwhichDuponts
borrow. This enforcement policy would raise the welfare of Duponts and that of Debtor’s gov-
ernment at the expense of Duponds (and creditors). As in the previous case, commitment does
not lead to the full-enforcement allocation.20
In all of the examples up to now, governments preferred not to enforce payments ex-post. We
have just seen two examples in which governments also prefer not to enforce some payments ex-
ante. Inthesecases, theequilibriumwithcommitmenthasdifferentconsumptionandwelfarethan
the equilibrium with full enforcement. The latter can be implemented with strategic enforcement
and secondary markets, but the former cannot.
II. The general case
Results (i)-(iv) were obtained with the help of a very stylized setup. This was useful to build
intuitions. But these results apply to a very broad class of models that encompasses many of
those that have been used in the previous literature. In this section, we provide a formal proof of
these results in a general setup with many regions, many periods, many shocks, many sources of
market incompleteness and many sources of heterogeneity within and between regions.
For obvious reasons, the style of this section is more formal and technical than that of the
previous one. Some readers might prefer to read ﬁrst Section III where we go back to the informal
style of Section I and use simple variants of the D-C World to show the limits of the argument
and develop further intuitions.
A. The model
Consider a world economy with J regions, indexed by j 2 J ￿ f1;2;:::; Jg. Each region
contains a continuum of inﬁnitesimal individuals. We use I j to denote the set of individuals
located in region j, whereas IW D
S
j2J I j denotes the total population of the world. Let j.i/
denote the region where individual i lives, namely j.i/ D |Kif i 2 I|K.
The world lasts for T C 1 ￿ 1 periods, which are indexed by t 2 T ￿ f0;1;:::;Tg. Within
each period t, the timing is as follows: (i) a shock st 2 S is realized and individuals receive
an endowment yist ￿ 0 of a perishable consumption good, (ii) asset markets open and individ-
uals retrade existing assets and issue new ones, (iii) governments decide on the enforcement of
maturing assets, (iv) enforcement takes place, and (v) individuals consume.
Let st ￿ .s￿ j￿ D 0;1;:::;t / 2 St denote the history of realizations of the shock up to
period t. Let et and xt denote, respectively, the proﬁle of enforcement choices of all gov-
ernments and the proﬁle of post-trade asset holdings of all individuals in period t. Let ht ￿
.s￿;e￿;x￿ j￿ D 0;1;:::;t / 2 Ht denote the history of shocks and actions by governments and




2 H0t denote the history of shocks and past actions




2 H1t denote the history of
shocks, actions by individuals, and past actions by governments up to period t. The probability




t2T St, H ￿
S
t2T Ht, H0 ￿
S
t2T H0t, and H1 ￿
S
t2T H1t.
20Despite the preference for Duponts, the consumption allocation without commitment would still be the same as in
the full-enforcement equilibrium. This is because Debtor’s government would not need to enforce bond payments from
Duponts to Duponds since in the secondary market only Duponts would purchase bonds issued by other Duponts.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE SOVEREIGN RISK AND SECONDARY MARKETS 13
INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES AND ASSET STRUCTURE











￿h0t / ￿ uis￿.cih￿/ for all h0t 2 H0, i 2 IW,
where cih￿ denotes consumption by individual i at history h￿. All utility functions uis￿.￿/ are
either monotonic and strictly concave or zero,21 and that they can vary across shock histories and
individuals.
The asset structure of this economy is characterized by a set of available assets N, which
promise payments contingent on the history of shock realizations st. Trade in asset markets is
frictionless in the sense that all individuals in all histories can trade existing assets costlessly if
they are alive. The payment promised by asset n 2 N at history st is denoted by dstn. We use
Nst to denote the subset of assets for which dstn > 0. We allow for fairly general constraints
on the types and amounts of assets that may be issued at each history by each individual. For
example, (i) there may be no assets that pay in certain histories; (ii) there may be constraints
on the contingency of assets, such as only allowing for noncontingent bonds; (iii) agents might
face individual-speciﬁc constraints that limit the type and number of assets that they can issue;
(iv) an asset may be issued in some histories but not in others. The only assumption we make
on the asset structure itself is that asset payments are ‘separable.’ That is, for each asset, there
always exists a portfolio of existing assets that allows us to replicate each payment separately.
This assumption is sufﬁcient but not necessary for our main result to hold and its implications are
highlighted below. The simplest environment in which payments are separable is one in which
each asset n has a unique maturity period, which we will assume from now on: Ns￿ \ Ns￿K D ?
for all s￿;s￿K 2 S, ￿;￿0 2 T , and ￿ 6D ￿0.
The economy described so far is general enough to encompass many of the previous models
used in the literature as particular cases. In terms of asset structure, for example, we can replicate
the bond models commonly used in the literature. Such is the case if for all st;
￿
st￿0 2 St,
t 2 T , we impose d.st/Kn D dstn for all n 2 Nst. Our framework is also consistent with the two
benchmark models in terms of demographics:
￿ Inﬁnitely-lived representative-agent model: T D 1 and utilities, endowments, and asset-
market restrictions are identical for all individuals in the same region.
￿ Overlapping-Generations economies à la Samuelson: Individuals are partitioned into co-
horts I
j
t for t 2 T and j 2 J. An individual i 2 I
j
t resides in country j and lives during
periods ft;t C 1;:::;t C l ￿ 1g, where l is the number of periods individuals live. If i 2
I
j
t , thenuis￿.￿/ D 0, yis￿ D 0, andissuanceat￿ arezeroforall￿ = 2 ft;t C 1;:::;t C l ￿ 1g.
GOVERNMENT PREFERENCES AND ENFORCEMENT
Each region has a government, whose only action is to enforce payments promised by their
residents at each history h1t. We assume that governments have no ability to commit ex-ante
to enforcing or to not enforcing payments. That is, governments make a decision regarding the
enforcement of maturing payments owed by their residents at each history h1t 2 H1. Hence, at
21We allow uis￿ .￿/ D 0 to account for overlapping generations models.14 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
any given history h1t, the government of region j 2 J must decide on the enforcement of pay-
ments promised by assets n 2 Nst. We consider two alternative scenarios regarding government
preferences.
The ﬁrst scenario is that of full enforcement. In this scenario governments maximize enforce-
ment. As a result, they enforce all payments by their residents, regardless of the parties involved.
All individuals know that they will have to deliver all the payments promised by any asset that
they issue and that they will receive all the payments promised by any asset that they purchase.
The second scenario is that of strategic enforcement. In this scenario governments maximize a
welfare function. As a result, they enforce payments only insofar this raises welfare. In particular,





where ￿i ￿ 0 is the weight that the government assigns to the utility of individual i. Note that
governments attach zero weight to the utility of foreigners.
Governments can make different enforcement decisions for different payments owed by their
residents. In particular, governments can discriminate according to the characteristics of issuers
and holders. To be more precise, recall that we have allowed for individual heterogeneity in
endowments, preferences, restrictions on asset issues, and government weights. Let g denote a
group of individuals i 2 Ig and let g.i/ denote the group to which individual i belongs. Each
region j 2 J is partitioned into a set of groups of individuals with the same characteristics G j.
Namely, I j D
S
g2G j Ig; Ig \ Ig0
D ? if g 6D g0; and, for all i;i0 2 I j, g.i/ D g.i0/ only
if yist D yiKst for all st 2 S, uist D uiKst for all st 2 S, i and i0 face the same restrictions on
the types and amounts of assets that they can issue, and ￿i D ￿iK. Note that this means that all
individuals in a given group have the same characteristics, but there may be two individuals with
the same characteristics in different groups. Let GW D
S
j2J G j denote the set of all groups in
the world.
We assume that governments can discriminate according to the groups of the issuer and holder
when enforcing payments. However, governments cannot discriminate based on the identity of
the individual issuer and holder. In other words, if a government enforces the payment on asset
n 2 N from individual i 2 Ig to individual i0 2 Ig0
in a given history h1t 2 H1, then it must
enforce all payments on asset n from individuals in group g to individuals in group g0 in that
history. Let e
g
gKh1tn 2 f0;1g denote the decision of the government of region j regarding the
enforcement of payments on asset n owed by individuals in group g, to individuals in group g0,
at history h1t.22 We use e
g
gKh1tn D 1 to denote enforcement of such payments, and e
g
gKh1tn D 0
to denote nonenforcement. In order for individuals to take enforcement decisions as given in




h0tn denote the price of asset n issued by an individual that belongs to group g at history
h0t. Let xiK
ih0tn denote the holdings of asset n by individual i, issued by individual i0, before
trading in asset markets at history h0t. If i0 6D i, xi0
ih0tn ￿ 0 since i cannot hold a negative
amount of assets issued by i0. But xi
ih0tn ￿ 0 since it denotes the (negative of the) outstanding












enforcement choices, where # denotes
the number of elements in a given set.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE SOVEREIGN RISK AND SECONDARY MARKETS 15
assets issued by individual i. Let O xiK
ih0tn denote the holdings of asset n by individual i, issued by
individual i0, after trading in asset markets at history h0t. Naturally, for any nonmaturing asset n
at history h0t it must be the case that xiK
ih0.tC1/n D O xiK
ih0tn for all h0.tC1/ consistent with h0t. Also,
xi
ih0tn D 0 in period t D 0. Let the total net holdings of asset n by individual i at history h0t be









denote individual i’s net holding of asset n issued by members of group g at history h0t, before
(after) asset markets open.
Then, the budget constraints faced by an individual i 2 IW at history h0t 2 H0 are given by






































where O yih0t denotes the endowment left in the hands of individual i after trading in asset markets
and O xi
ih0tn must always satisfy the issuing constraints that individual i faces with respect to asset
n. Equation (12) states that an individual cannot have negative endowment after trading in
asset markets, while Equation (13) states that an individual’s consumption can be no greater
than his endowment after trading in asset markets plus the net payments received from maturing
assets. The latter takes into account the fact that not all payments from maturing assets might be






ih0tn D 0 for all h0t 2 H0, n 2 N, g 2 GW.
An equilibrium of the economy with full enforcement is a set of: (i) asset prices; (ii) consump-
tion proﬁles and asset holdings, and; (iii) enforcement decisions; such that (a) individuals maxi-
mize expected utility (Equation (10)) subject to their budget (Equations (12) and (13)) and issuing
constraints; (b) governments always enforce payments; and (c) markets clear (Equation (14)). We

























There are always many equilibria with the same consumption and prices that differ in their pre-
and/or post-trade asset holdings. The D-C World of Example 1 illustrates this. In addition, there
might be equilibria with different consumption and prices. For instance, the class of economies
being considered includes OLG economies that can have bubbly equilibria.
An equilibrium of the economy with strategic enforcement is a set of: (i) asset prices; (ii) con-
sumption proﬁles and asset holdings, and; (iii) enforcement decisions; such that (a) individuals
maximize expected utility (Equation (10)) subject to their budget (Equations (12) and (13)) and
issuing constraints; (b) governments maximize their objective function (Equation (11)); and (c)
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Both with full and strategic enforcement, individuals behave competitively, in the sense that
they take future asset prices and enforcement as given. This is because there is a positive measure
of individuals in each group g 2 GW, so a deviation by any single individual does not affect asset
prices and, in the case of strategic enforcement, the payoffs that governments obtain from any
given enforcement policy. With strategic enforcement, on the other hand, governments take into
account the potential effects of enforcement policies on future histories.
B. Main result
Our main result is that for each equilibrium with full enforcement there is a corresponding
equilibriumwithstrategicenforcementthatdeliversthesameconsumptionproﬁlesand, therefore,
the same level of welfare. We now prove this result in the general setup described above, thereby
substantially extending result (i) of Section I:
PROPOSITION 4: Consider an economy satisfying the previous assumptions regarding prefer-
ences, endowments, asset markets, and enforcement technology. For each equilibrium with full
enforcement, there exists a corresponding equilibrium with strategic enforcement in which all
individuals i 2 IW attain the same consumption and welfare.
The proof is by construction. Take an equilibrium of the economy with full enforcement.
It is always possible to ﬁnd an alternative equilibrium with full enforcement that delivers the
same consumption and welfare and in which asset holdings and asset prices do not depend on
the history of enforcement. This alternative equilibrium is: (i) feasible, because enforcement
decisions affect contemporaneous consumption but they do not affect the resources available to
individuals for future trading; and (ii) consistent with individual maximization because nobody











































































for all ht 2 H,
h0t 2 H0, n 2 N, g 2 GW, i 2 IW.











￿ih0tn if n 2 Nst and i 2 Ig






if n = 2 Nst







D 1 for all n 2 Nst, h1t 2 H1, g 2 GW,
with
R
i2Ig ￿ih0tn D 0 and
P
n2Nst ￿ih0tn ￿ .ciht/￿ for all h0t 2 H0, ht 2 H, n 2 Nst, g 2 GW,
i 2 IW. Equation (15) states that, after trading in asset markets, all maturing assets are held byVOL. VOL NO. ISSUE SOVEREIGN RISK AND SECONDARY MARKETS 17
individuals that belong to the same group as the issuer, while nonmaturing assets are held as in
the full-enforcement equilibrium. Equation (16) states that governments enforce payments of all

























is an equilibrium with strategic enforcement.
We ﬁrst show that the proposed equilibrium satisﬁes individual maximization. Given govern-
ments’ enforcement policies, prices are the same as in the equilibrium with full enforcement.
In particular, maturing assets still trade at face value. As a result, the consumption proﬁles and
the pretrade asset holdings of the equilibrium with full enforcement must also be consistent with
individual maximization under strategic enforcement. The fact that maturing assets trade at face
value also implies that (i) individuals are indifferent between buying or not buying maturing as-
sets issued by members of their same group; and (ii) individuals prefer (at least weakly) to sell
maturing assets issued by members of different groups. In addition, individuals are satisfying
their budget constraints. Equation (13) is satisﬁed because maturing assets trade at face value
and all payments are enforced. And Equation (12) is also satisﬁed because it follows from Equa-
tion (13) and the condition
P
n2Nst ￿ih0tn ￿ .ciht/￿.23 Finally, individuals satisfy their issuance
constraints since their issuance is the same as in the equilibrium with full enforcement.
We next show that the proposed equilibrium also satisﬁes government maximization. The
analysis is substantially simpliﬁed by the fact that, in the alternative equilibrium with full en-
forcement from which we started, individuals’ actions do not depend on past enforcement deci-
sions. Thus, we only need to check that governments do not have incentives to deviate at any










i2I j ￿i ￿ Uiht which, given the proposed




















gh1tn D 1 for all g 2 G j and n 2 Nst, the government of j guarantees that
consumption is equalized within each domestic group, i.e. .ciht/￿ D .ci0ht/￿ whenever g.i/ D
g.i0/. Choosing any other enforcement would not affect total consumption in each group but
will, in general, lead to consumption inequality within groups. A straightforward application of
Jensen’s inequality shows then that the proposed enforcement is a best response for governments.
Finally, we show that the proposed equilibrium satisﬁes market clearing. This is clearly the









i2Ig ￿ih0tn D 0 for all h0t 2 H0 and g 2 GW. With this, we
complete the proof of the proposition.
We have shown that (a) if governments are expected to enforce within-group payments, in-
dividual maximization leads to each group purchasing its own maturing assets; and (b) if each
group purchases its own maturing assets, within-group enforcement is consistent with govern-
ment maximization. This combination of asset trade and enforcement always allows the econ-
omy with strategic enforcement to achieve the same consumption and welfare as the economy
with full enforcement. This is sufﬁcient to prove Proposition 4. In general, there are many
23The assumption that asset payments are separable ensures that all groups have enough funds to repurchase at face
value all the assets that they have issued in the past and mature at the considered history.18 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
alternative combinations of asset trade and enforcement that achieve the same result. These al-
ternatives involve groups with large weights in the governments objective function and/or low
consumption purchasing maturing assets issued by other groups.
C. Additional equilibria with strategic enforcement
We have shown that each equilibrium with full enforcement has a corresponding equilibrium
with strategic enforcement that delivers the same consumption and welfare. However, with strate-
gic enforcement there are additional equilibria with nonenforcement in equilibrium.







D 0 for all h1t 2 H1, n 2 Nst, g;g0 2 GW.
Given that no payments are expected to be enforced, and that each individual takes enforcement










D 0 for all h0t 2 H0, n 2 N, i;i0 2 IW,
sincenoindividualiswillingtoholdanyassets. This, inturn, impliesthatgovernmentsarealways
indifferent between enforcing and not enforcing payments, so that nonenforcement is consistent
with government optimization. Hence, the economy with strategic enforcement always has a
pessimistic equilibrium in which there is no trade in assets because; (i) everyone expects that no
payments will ever be enforced; and.(ii) given these expectations, nonenforcement is an optimal
strategy for governments.
Besides equilibria that implement the allocations with full enforcement and the pessimistic
equilibrium just described, the economy with strategic enforcement will typically have other
equilibria in which there is less than full enforcement because some –but not all– asset payments
are expected not to be enforced. For example, consider that expectations regarding enforcement






D 1forallh1t 2 H1,
n 2 Nst. This enforcement proﬁle will generically deliver an equilibrium in which assets issued
by group g are traded, so that consumption proﬁles will be different from those of the pessimistic
equilibrium but also from the ones that would arise under full enforcement. Examples of this
type of equilibria were provided in Section 1.3. Proposition 5 summarizes the discussion:
PROPOSITION 5: Consider an economy satisfying the previous assumptions regarding prefer-
ences, endowments, asset markets, and enforcement technology. With strategic enforcement, this
economy has pessimistic equilibria characterized by total or partial lack of enforcement.
This proposition extends result (ii) of Section I. Naturally, result (iii) follows directly from our
analysis of the D-C World with Names and the L-U World.
D. Robustness
We have established that the economy with strategic enforcement has many equilibria, which
differ in consumption and welfare. We now assess the robustness of these equilibria. To do so,
we modify our environment along two dimensions:
￿ Small preference for enforcement: Governments suffer an arbitrarily small welfare loss
from nonenforcement. In particular, a government suffers a welfare cost b whenever it
chooses not to enforce payments on a given asset from a given group of its residents to anyVOL. VOL NO. ISSUE SOVEREIGN RISK AND SECONDARY MARKETS 19
other given group of individuals. Hence, the government of region j 2 J, at any history
h1t maximizes the objective function
Z
i2I j










￿ Strategies are not contingent on the history of enforcement: The strategies of individuals
and governments are independent of past enforcement decisions. This assumption implies,
in particular, that there can be no reputational equilibria.
If we make these two additional assumptions, all pessimistic equilibria cease to exist. The
reason is simple. Consider the pessimistic equilibrium in which no assets are traded because
individuals expect the enforcement policy to be as in Equation (17). Under the additional as-
sumptions, these expectations cannot be correct in equilibrium. Given any history h1t, when
governments decide on enforcement, they ﬁnd that no maturing assets have been traded. Conse-
quently, the enforcement decision has no effects on contemporaneous consumption. Moreover,
since strategies are not contingent on the history of enforcement, this decision will not have any
effect on future consumption either. Therefore, a small preference for enforcement is sufﬁcient
to induce governments to enforce payments. A similar reasoning rules out equilibria in which
there is less than full enforcement because some -but not all- asset payments are expected not to
be enforced.
Proposition 6 summarizes the discussion above:
PROPOSITION 6: Consider an economy satisfying the previous assumptions regarding prefer-
ences, endowments, asset markets, and enforcement technology. Modify this economy by assum-
ing that: (i) governments face an arbitrarily small welfare loss b > 0 whenever they choose not
to enforce payments on a given asset from a given group of their residents to any other given
group of individuals, and; (ii) strategies of individuals and governments are independent of past
enforcement decisions. The only equilibria with strategic enforcement of the modiﬁed economy
are those that deliver the same consumption and welfare as the equilibria with full enforcement.
Proposition 6 substantially extends result (iv) of Section I. At ﬁrst sight, the need for the
second additional assumption might be surprising since secondary markets sufﬁce by themselves
to attain full enforcement and there is therefore no scope for building a reputation for enforcing
payments. However, this assumption is necessary because there are times in which governments
want to build a reputation for not enforcing payments. The following example illustrates this
situation:
EXAMPLE 7 (L-U World Inﬁnitely Repeated): All assumptions are as in the L-U World, except
that the world lasts for inﬁnitely many periods. Individuals maximize a utility function: Ui D P1
tD0 ￿t ￿ u.cit/ for all i 2 IW D IH [ IF. All individuals receive an endowment of y at t D 0.
In all periods t ￿ 1, there are two possible states that occur with equal probability. If st D sH,
Home is lucky and its residents receive an endowment equal to y C ", while Foreign is unlucky
and its residents receive an endowment equal to y ￿ ". If st D sF, Home is unlucky and its
residents receive an endowment equal to y ￿ ", while Foreign is lucky and its residents receive
an endowment equal to y C ".
As in our basic version of the L-U World, we assume that the only assets that can be traded are
noncontingent bonds that promise to deliver one unit of the consumption good at a given period
t, for all t ￿ 1.
In the L-U World Inﬁnitely Repeated, the ﬁrst additional assumption does not sufﬁce to elimi-
nate pessimistic equilibria. To see this, consider an equilibrium of this world in which individual20 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
expectations are such that, for all t ￿ 1: (i) given st D s j, the government of region j is ex-
pected to enforce domestic payments whereas the government of the other region is expected not
to do so; (ii) if in any given period a government deviates from the expected behavior speciﬁed in
(i), both governments are expected to enforce domestic payments in all future periods thereafter,
regardless of the realizations of the endowment shocks.
Such an equilibrium entails nonenforcement in some states and attains full risk-sharing be-
tween regions. Moreover, it need not disappear with a small preference for enforcement b. The
reason is that, whenever the government of the unlucky region is considering whether to devi-
ate and enforce domestic payments, it faces a trade-off. On the one hand, it avoids the welfare
loss b. On the other, it destroys risk-sharing in all future periods. It can be shown that, for b
small enough, governments will choose not to enforce domestic payments whenever their region
receives the unlucky shock.24
III. Limits to the argument
The general setup of Section II encompasses many of the models commonly used to study the
effects of sovereign risk. Unlike the previous literature, however, we have allowed individuals to
freely retrade existing assets. This turned out to be a crucial change in assumption since it leads
to the new result that, even in the absence of default penalties, sovereign risk does not affect
consumption and welfare. Perhaps surprisingly, the only effect of sovereign risk is to increase
trade volume as individuals trade not only to redistribute their consumption across periods and
states of nature, but also to circumvent the strategic or opportunistic behavior of governments.
The general setup of the previous section has therefore identiﬁed a set of assumptions under
which sovereign risk does not matter or is irrelevant. This constitutes a useful theoretical bench-
mark that can help us improve our understanding of why sovereign risk is a problem in real
economies. In this section, we show why and how sovereign risk matters once we relax some
assumptions that play a crucial role in the proof of our result and might seem unrealistic. In
particular, we focus on the following assumptions:
￿ Well-functioning markets. We have assumed that markets, if they exist, are frictionless and
competitive:
– (No trading frictions) All individuals can trade in asset markets with zero transaction
costs in all periods and states of nature.
– (Competitive behavior) All individuals are inﬁnitesimal and, as a result, they take
prices and enforcement decisions of governments as given.
￿ Passivegovernments. Wehaveassumedthatgovernmentstrategicallychoosesenforcement
without commitment and have no other policy tools at their disposal:
– (Timingofenforcement)Governmentschooseenforcementonlyaftersecondarymar-
kets open and trade has already taken place.
– (Lack of government intervention) Governments only choose enforcement and do not
have other policy tools at their disposal to intervene in markets.
Needless to say, a complete treatment of the effects of relaxing these assumptions in the general
setup of Section II is beyond the scope of this paper. We instead return to the D-C World of






2u.y C "/ C 1
2u.y ￿ "/
ii
.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE SOVEREIGN RISK AND SECONDARY MARKETS 21
Section I and develop further variants to sketch the main implications of removing each of these
assumptions.25;26
A. Transaction costs
In the general setup of Section II we considered a rich set of restrictions on the issuance of
new assets. These restrictions affect both the set of contingencies that assets can incorporate
and the set of individuals that can issue them in each period and state of nature. When these
restrictions are binding, useful assets are missing and proﬁtable trade opportunities are lost. As
a result, the equilibrium might be Pareto inefﬁcient. But even in this case, we always allowed
all living individuals (including those that cannot issue new assets) to freely trade all existing
assets in all periods and states of nature. That is, although we allowed for restrictions in the
number and type of assets that can exist, we also assumed that those assets that do exist are
traded frictionlessly. This assumption is important since we have argued that sovereign risk
only increases trade volume and this has no welfare consequences. What happens instead if this
additional trade is costly? The next example introduces transaction costs in the D-C World:
EXAMPLE 8 (D-C World with Transaction Costs): All assumptions are as in the D-C World,
except that buyers and sellers must pay a proportional or ad valorem transaction cost equal to
tB and tS, respectively.
With full enforcement, creditors collect bond payments directly from the issuers of the bonds
and, as a result, they only go to the primary market. This means that the relevant bond return for
them is 1
￿
.q0 ￿ .1 C tB//, while the relevant bond return for debtors is .1 C tS/
￿
q0. The wedge
between these bond returns is .1 C tB/ ￿ .1 C tS/. Naturally, the model of Section 1.1. applies
as the case in which transaction costs are negligible, i.e. tB D tS D 0, and there is no wedge.
Starting from this benchmark or limiting case, increases in tS reduce the supply of bonds while
increases in tB reduce the demand for bonds. Both shifts lead to lower trade and less consumption
smoothing. Eventually, the combined value of transaction costs crosses the threshold that makes
them prohibitive,
.1 C tB/ ￿ .1 C tS/ D
￿
u0 .y ￿ "/
u0 .y C "/
￿2
.
At this point, all trade disappears and each region consumes its own endowment.
With strategic enforcement, creditors cannot collect bond payments directly and are forced
to sell their bonds in the secondary market. As a result, the relevant bond return for them is
now q1
￿
.q0 ￿ .1 C tB/ ￿ .1 C tS//. Debtors only purchase their bonds in the secondary market
if those are sold with a discount that compensates for the transaction cost: q1 ￿ .1 C tB/ D 1.
Therefore, the wedge between bond returns is now one order of magnitude higher than in the
full enforcement case, .1 C tB/2 ￿ .1 C tS/2. The reason, of course, is that the additional trading
in the secondary market implies that transaction costs are paid twice. Starting from the limiting
case of zero transaction costs, we ﬁnd again that increases in tS reduce the supply of bonds.
But now they also reduce the demand for bonds since creditors must also pay these transaction
costs Tomorrow when they sell their bonds in the secondary market. Moreover, increases in tB
lead now to a larger reduction in the demand for bonds since they have the additional effect of
lowering the price of bonds in the secondary market. Like the case of full enforcement, increases
25Another assumption that might turn out to be important is that, for each asset, there exist always a portfolio of
existing assets that allows us to replicate each asset payment separately. This assumption is sufﬁcient (but not necessary)
to ensure that there are enough funds in the secondary market to purchase all assets that deliver payments at face value.
Relaxing this assumption might lead to situations in which the secondary market is not liquid enough and this creates
problems. Given the current length of this paper, we do not analyze this case here.
26Inwhatfollows, weselectthesetofoptimisticequilibriaandrefertoitas‘the’setofstrategic-enforcementequilibria.22 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
in transaction costs lower trade and consumption smoothing. But this now happens at a faster
rate since each transaction cost applies twice to each bond payment. Note also that the threshold
that makes transaction costs prohibitive is lower now,
.1 C tB/ ￿ .1 C tS/ D
u0 .y ￿ "/
u0 .y C "/
.
This example shows how sovereign risk magniﬁes the negative effects of transaction costs on
consumption and welfare. With transaction costs, the full- and strategic-enforcement equilibria
are still similar qualitatively but might differ quantitatively. Knowing that Debtor’s government
will not enforce bond payments to creditors, the latter are forced to go to the secondary market to
sell their bonds and must incur additional transaction costs. Since these additional costs are pure
waste, sovereign risk lowers the level of consumption. Since these additional costs increase the
wedge between bond returns for debtors and creditors, sovereign risk also worsens the intertem-
poral distribution of consumption. In a nutshell, in the presence of transaction costs we have that
sovereign risk affects consumption and reduces welfare.
Another popular model of transaction costs assumes that some individuals have negligible
costs of going to the market, while the rest have prohibitive costs. This structure of costs gives
rise to limited participation. Although transaction costs are never paid in equilibrium, the absence
of some individuals from the market might also restore a negative role for sovereign risk, as the
following example illustrates:
EXAMPLE 9 (D-C World with Limited Participation): AllassumptionsareasintheD-Cworld,
except that only a fraction ￿
j




tion affects the demand and supply for bonds symmetrically and the price of bonds remains one.









limited participation reduces more the demand (supply) for bonds, the price of bonds falls below
(goes above) one, and market participants choose an upward-sloping (downward-sloping) con-
sumption proﬁle. In any event, those that cannot participate in the primary market are forced to
live in autarky and consume their own endowment. Since the secondary market is not used, the
equilibrium outcome does not depend on who can participate in it.
With strategic enforcement, creditors that purchase bonds in the primary market will want to
go to the secondary market and sell their bonds at face value. If this is possible, sovereign risk
does not affect consumption and welfare even when there is limited participation. However, this
need not be the case.
Consider ﬁrst the situation in which debtors participating in the secondary market do not have
enough resources to repurchase the full-enforcement stock of bonds at face value, i.e. ￿D
1 ￿








￿. It is clear that, in this case, the strategic enforcement equilibrium will
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welfare.27
In addition, consider the situation in which all creditors participating in the primary market run
some risk of being excluded from the secondary market. In this case, there is necessarily default
in equilibrium. To some extent, both debtors and creditors can diversify this risk by trading in
the primary market with many residents of the other region. Creditors can further reduce their
exposure to this risk by channeling their lending through those individuals that are most likely to
participate in the secondary market. In general, however, it is not possible to fully diversify the
risk of default and sovereign risk leads to risky consumption.28 This is clearly negative for both
debtors and creditors. In turn, there is an additional effect that operates through bond returns in
a way that depends on the third derivative of the utility function. If the latter is positive, we have
the standard case of precautionary savings in which increases in uncertainty lower bond returns.
This terms-of-trade effect beneﬁts Debtor and hurts Creditor. The net effect of default risk is
therefore negative for Creditor but ambiguous for Debtor. Naturally, the opposite is true if the
third derivative of the utility function is negative.
We could examine the effects of introducing other trading frictions. But the two examples of
this section already convey a simple and, we think, quite robust intuition: since additional trade
is needed to circumvent the strategic or opportunistic behavior of governments, sovereign risk
magniﬁes the negative effects of trading frictions on consumption and welfare.
B. Large agents
An important assumption that we have made throughout the paper is that agents are small, in
the sense that they take enforcement decisions and asset prices as given. This assumption has
two important implications that we have invoked repeatedly for our result, namely: (a) there are
always individuals who are willing to repurchase maturing assets at face value in the secondary
market and; (b) these individuals actually have the resources to do so. In this section, we explore
the implications of relaxing the assumption of small agents, by allowing for agents with positive
mass or ‘large’ agents. As we now show, the presence of such agents may substantially affect the
demand for maturing assets in the secondary markets.
We begin by framing our discussion within a variation of our D-C World that allows for large
agents:
EXAMPLE 10 (D-C World with Large Agents): All assumptions are as in the D-C World, ex-
cept that: (i) there is a continuum of inﬁnitesimal debtors with mass ￿D that make their decisions
collectively (i.e., a Debtor Bank), and, (ii) there is a continuum of inﬁnitesimal creditors with
mass ￿C that also make their decisions collectively (i.e., a Creditor Bank).
Suppose ﬁrst that ￿D D 1 and ￿C D 0. Under full enforcement, the presence of a large agent
affects the equilibrium because it has market power. In fact, the Debtor Bank is a monopolist in
the bond market Today: consequently, it will restrict the supply of bonds in order to raise their




￿￿ > 1. Under strategic enforcement, though, the
effects of having a unique debtor are much stronger, to the extent that Debtor is unable to borrow
at all. The reason is simple: suppose the Debtor Bank issues any positive amount of bonds Today.
Creditors purchase these bonds because they expect to sell them Tomorrow before enforcement.
Once Tomorrow arrives, though, the Debtor Bank will never buy any of its bonds in the secondary
market. It understands that, by purchasing its bonds at any positive price it is simply transferring
resources to creditors. Therefore, it must necessarily be the case that .qD
1 /￿￿ D 0 in equilibrium.
27It also creates inequality among debtors, since those that participate in the secondary market make capital gains on
the bonds they repurchase.
28One particular case in which full diversiﬁcation is possible is when ￿C
1 is nonstochastic.24 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
Anticipating this, creditors will not buy any bonds Today and the only possible equilibrium is one
of autarky in which each region consumes its endowment.
What insight do we gain from this example? In the original D-C World, secondary markets
are able to achieve the full-enforcement allocation because each individual debtor has a strong
incentive to purchase bonds issued by other debtors. This outcome, which constitutes an ex-
post inefﬁciency from the viewpoint of the region, ensures ex-ante efﬁciency by allowing for
international trade in bonds Today. But this prisoner’s dilemma type of situation only arises
insofar as debtors are small and behave noncooperatively. If there is a unique debtor, as in our
example, this reasoning no longer applies.
Of course, the case in which ￿D D 1 is rather extreme, since the Debtor Bank is the only
potential purchaser of its bonds in the secondary market. We now turn to the more interesting case
in which ￿D < 1. We maintain ￿C D 0. Under full enforcement, the equilibrium is qualitatively
similarasbefore: theDebtorBankstillhasmarketpower, sothatthesupplyofbondsislower, and
their market price Today higher, than what they would be in the traditional D-C World. Under
strategic enforcement, though, the presence of small debtors can make a substantial difference





￿￿￿ bonds Today. When secondary markets open, small debtors are willing to buy
any quantity of bonds at face value. Therefore, their aggregate demand for bonds is horizontal
until all the combined endowment of small debtors has been exhausted, and downward-sloping
thereafter. The equilibrium price is therefore equal to face value if their combined endowment is
sufﬁcient to repurchase all the bonds issued in the primary market at face value. In this case, and
despite the large agent, the strategic-enforcement equilibrium delivers the same allocation as the
full-enforcement one.
To make the example interesting, assume from now on that ￿D is sufﬁciently large to ensure
that the combined endowment of the small debtors is not enough to repurchase all the bonds
issued in the primary market. In this case, small debtors will use all of their endowment to
purchase bonds in the secondary market.29 But this is not the end of the story: once small debtors
purchase bonds in the secondary market, it is in the interest of the Debtor Bank to enter the
market as well. Assume not. Then, the Debtor Bank could make a proﬁt by buying its own
bonds at a discount instead of paying face value later when small agents come to redeem them.
In equilibrium, the Debtor Bank will buy bonds up to the point in which this gain is offset by the





























￿￿￿ < 1, which is decreasing in ￿D and approaches
zero as ￿D ! 1. Hence, equilibrium borrowing in Debtor is restricted with respect to the full-
enforcement economy. When the large agent is not too large, the Prisoner’s dilemma is only
partially solved and Debtor can still borrow but not as much as it would like.
Before concluding, we wish to remark on the effects of allowing for large creditors. We now
do so by setting ￿C D 1. We also maintain ￿D < 1. A ﬁrst natural consequence of having a
unique creditor –which is valid both under full and strategic enforcement– is that he will be a
monopsonist in the primary market for bonds. This will exert downward pressure both on the
29As long as u.0/ D ￿1, domestic payments are always enforced in equilibrium. We maintain this assumption
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price of bonds and on the amount of trade in the primary market. However, the presence of a
large creditor does not affect the functioning of the secondary market. It could be thought that
the Creditor Bank has an incentive to restrict the supply of bonds Tomorrow in order to raise
their price, but it is never proﬁtable to do so. This is evident if ￿D D 0 and the Creditor Bank
can sell all bonds at face value. It is also evident if ￿D D 1 and the Creditor Bank is unable to
sell them at any positive price. It can also be shown that if ￿D 2 .0;1/, restricting the supply of
bonds is still not worthwhile because this decreases the Debtor Bank’s demand for bonds more
than proportionally (see Equation (18)).
There are therefore two main ﬁndings in this section. The ﬁrst one is that coordination among
debtors might restrict their collective ability to borrow. In fact, imagine that the government
of Debtor generates an institutional arrangement that forces debtors to coordinate their actions.
In a world of full enforcement, this would be a perfectly sensible policy from the viewpoint of
Debtor, since it would allow its residents to exploit their collective market power and access
international capital markets at better terms. In a world of strategic enforcement, on the other
hand, this institutional arrangement might backﬁre if it persists until the time of enforcement.
The same market power that beneﬁts debtors at the time of borrowing allows them to distort the
outcome of the secondary market: in the extreme case in which all residents of Debtor coordinate
their actions, as we have seen, the latter effect manifests itself fully and eliminates all possibility
of international borrowing.
The second ﬁnding of this section is that coordination among creditors does not enhance their
ability to collect on maturing assets. Coordination among creditors certainly enhances their mar-
ket power and allows them to lend at a higher interest rate. How much they actually collect from
their outstanding loans at the time of maturity, though, is ultimately determined by the degree
of coordination among debtors. In our world, then, institutional arrangements such as collective
action clauses, which are designed to coordinate creditors in order to enhance repayment, are
ineffective. The reason for this is clear: creditors in our environment never receive payments
directly from debtors, so that coordinating does not beneﬁt them in terms of negotiation or bar-
gaining power. Indeed, they are only able to collect from maturing assets by selling them in the
secondary market. Since coordination does not enable them to distort the outcome of the latter in
their favor, their ability to extract resources from debtors is not affected by it.
C. The timing of enforcement
Throughout, we have assumed that governments have no commitment and choose their en-
forcement policy at the time of enforcement. The other extreme of assuming that governments
can commit for the indeﬁnite future is certainly unrealistic.30 But it seems reasonable to assume
that governments might have some ability to commit in the short run. To determine the effects
of this ‘short-term commitment,’ in the remaining of the section we analyze the case in which
governments make their enforcement decisions for each period before secondary markets open.
This extension captures well a situation in which governments have the power to preempt trade in
secondary markets by credibly promising not to enforce before trading takes place. The question
we address here is when and how the government will use this power and the effects this has.
At ﬁrst sight, one might be tempted to conclude that endowing the government with this power
is devastating for the argument that, in the presence of secondary markets, sovereign risk has no
effects on consumption and welfare. For example, in both the D-C World and the L-U World
introducing short-term commitment completely destroys asset trade. Before secondary markets
open Tomorrow the government of any region whose residents owe payments to foreigners un-
derstands that its residents are about to repay their debts to foreigners via secondary markets. But
such a government would prevent this by choosing not to enforce before secondary markets open
30See section 1.6 for a discussion of this case in the D-C World.26 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
driving the price of domestic debt to zero. Of course, anticipating this Today the residents of the
other region are not willing to purchase domestic debt and, thus, there is no trade in the primary
market. Gaining short-term commitment destroys all trade and forces each region and individuals
to consume their own endowment. Everybody (including governments) is worse off. The conclu-
sion seems to be therefore that, if governments have short-term commitment, sovereign risk has
the traditional effect of eliminating foreign trade and reducing welfare.
But this would be too hasty a conclusion. Although governments always have an incentive to
commit not to enforce to avoid payments to foreigners, there may be countervailing forces that
might lead to enforcement and asset trade even when governments have short-term commitment.
The next two examples illustrate this.
The ﬁrst example generalizes the D-C World by introducing a role for domestic trade in pri-
mary markets and shows how this can reduce the governments’ ability to preempt payments to
foreigners:31
EXAMPLE 11 (D-C World with Ex-Post Inequality): All assumptions are as in the D-C World,
except that debtors are subject to idiosyncratic shocks Tomorrow. In particular, there are two
states Tomorrow, s1 and s2, each taking place with probability one half. If a given debtor is lucky,
he receives y C " C ￿; otherwise, he receives y C " ￿ ￿. Debtors are partitioned into two halves,
I1 and I2, such that all i 2 I1 are lucky in state s1 and all i 2 I2 are lucky in state s2.
In this version of the D-C World there might be gains from domestic trade because there is
ex-post heterogeneity among debtors. The basic D-C World of Example 1 applies as the special
case in which ￿ D 0. We assume that markets are complete and that there are two assets: asset 1
pays one in state s1 and zero in state s2, and asset 2 pays zero in state s1 and one in state s2. In
the full-enforcement equilibrium all debtors and creditors consume y in both periods. If ￿ ￿ ",
this consumption allocation can (but need not) be implemented with only international trade. If
￿ > ", this consumption allocation also requires domestic asset trade between debtors.
The key effect of short-term commitment in this world is that enforcement becomes nondis-
criminatory. In particular, while Debtor’s government can still choose enforcement before in-
dividuals trade in secondary markets, it cannot discriminate between debtor and creditor asset
holders. The reason is that even if Debtor’s government committed only to enforcing payments
between debtors, creditors would resell their assets in the secondary market to debtors at face
value and would de facto receive their payment. Thus, if Debtor’s government wants to avoid
payments to creditors, it must commit not to enforce any payments. This introduces a crucial
trade-off: committing not to enforce avoids payments to creditors and increases the average con-
sumption of debtors, while committing to enforce preserves payments between debtors and im-
proves the distribution of consumption among them. Enforcement will take place if and only if
the following condition holds:
(19) u.y/ ￿
u.y C " C ￿/ C u.y C " ￿ ￿/
2
.
Equation (19) is satisﬁed if idiosyncratic shocks are sufﬁciently large relative to regional shocks
and the utility function is sufﬁciently concave. In this case, preserving domestic payments is
worth more than avoiding foreign ones. If this condition holds, the economy with short-term
commitment also implements the full-enforcement allocation. If this condition fails, however,
the only equilibrium is one in which there is no trade and each individual consumes its own
31This example is a stylized version of the worlds considered by Fernando Broner and Jaume Ventura (2005, 2008).
Broner and Ventura (2005) use a generalization of this model with many goods and transport costs to study the effects of
trade integration on the structure of asset markets, domestic and international risk sharing, and welfare. Broner and Ven-
tura (2008) use another generalization of this model with capital accumulation to study the effects of ﬁnancial integration
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endowment. In the latter case, gaining short-term commitment destroys both domestic and inter-
national asset trade and everybody (including governments) is worse off.
Short-term commitment gives Debtor’s government the ability to preempt the secondary mar-
ket and render it ineffective. However, the situation is not the same as one in which secondary
markets are simply missing. When secondary markets are missing, the government can discrim-
inate between domestic and foreign payments and would choose to enforce the former but not
the latter. This destroys international asset trade but does not affect domestic asset trade. When
there are secondary markets and governments have short-term commitment, on the other hand,
depending on whether Equation (19) holds either both international and domestic asset trade are
unrestricted or neither is possible.32
The second example shows that, when there are more than two periods and we allow for long-
term assets, individuals can reduce the governments’ ability to preempt payments to foreigners:
EXAMPLE 12 (D-C World with Three Periods): All assumptions are as in the D-C World, ex-
cept that there are three periods, Today, Tomorrow, and The-Day-After, indexed by t 2 f0;1;2g.
The-Day-After all individuals in the world receive an endowment equal to y.
Assume ﬁrst that the only available assets are short-term bonds. In particular, Today individ-
uals can only issue bonds that pay Tomorrow, while Tomorrow they can issue bonds that pay
The-Day-After. The full-enforcement allocation is characterized by all individuals in the world
consuming y in each of the three periods. Today debtors sell " bonds to creditors, which they
repay Tomorrow. The-Day-After all individuals simply consume their own endowment. With
short-term commitment, no asset trade is possible and individuals are forced to consume their en-
dowment in each of the three periods. Does adding a third period then not make any difference?
It does, if we allow for long-term bonds.
Allowing for long-term bonds makes a difference, though. Assume now that Today individuals
can also issue bonds that pay The-Day-After. What would happen if Today debtors sold " long-
term bonds to creditors? With full-enforcement, debtors would repurchase these bonds from
creditors Tomorrow. By doing so they would end up consuming y both Tomorrow and The-
Day-After, while any individual who did not do this would consume y C " Tomorrow and y ￿ "
The-Day-After. But note that the same would happen with short-term commitment. Since these
bonds are enforced The-Day-After, Debtor’s government makes its enforcement decision only
after secondary markets close Tomorrow. But by then debtors have already repurchased all bonds
at face value from creditors. As a result, with long-term bonds the full-enforcement allocation is
achieved even with short-term commitment.33;34
The intuition for this result is that, just as governments have an ex-post incentive to preempt
secondary markets and avoid payments to foreigners, domestic residents have an incentive to
issue assets of a long-enough maturity to preempt such government intervention. There is an in-
teresting parallel between Example 12 and the rest of the paper. Just as we had previously shown
32In this example there exists an overborrowing externality that sometimes leads to the destruction of domestic asset
trade. Capital controls to limit ex-ante borrowing from foreigners are often optimal in this context. For recent discus-
sions of the problem, see Ricardo J. Caballero and Arvind Krishnamurthy (2001), Eduardo Fernández-Arias and Davide
Lombardo (2002), Jean Tirole (2003), Kehoe and Perri (2004), Karsten Jeske (2006), Martin Uribe (2006), and Wright
(2006).
33Example 12 suggests an interesting relationship between the length of commitment, the persistence of endowment
shocks, and the maturity of assets. We conjecture that assets need to have a long enough maturity relative to the persis-
tence of shocks and length of commitment, so that they can be repurchased while endowments are high but before the
government decides enforcement.
34In reality, bonds often have acceleration clauses that might facilitate default. Example 12 suggests that such clauses
might have unintended costs in terms of enforcement.28 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
that allowing for additional markets, which are redundant with full-enforcement, can increase en-
forcement, Example 12 shows that allowing for additional assets, which are also redundant with
full-enforcement, can also increase enforcement.
The examples and discussion of this section show that the timing of enforcement matters,
and that the connection between commitment, enforcement, and the role of secondary markets
is a subtle one. When the country has debts due to foreigners, the government always has an
incentive to commit to not enforcing and preempt trading in secondary markets. But there are
countervailing forces. First, when there is not only international but also domestic asset trade,
the effect of short-term commitment on enforcement depends on whether domestic or foreign
payments are more important. While it is possible for enforcement to be maintained, it is also
possible that domestic asset trade be destroyed along with international asset trade. Second,
the maturity of assets can play an important role in the effects of short-term commitment on
enforcement. In particular, creating assets with long enough maturities might have beneﬁts that
go beyond the standard ones.
D. Government intervention
We have assumed throughout that governments’ only tool to affect market outcomes is en-
forcement policy. This is clearly unrealistic. Governments will actively use all policy tools at
their disposal to stop the secondary markets from thwarting their attempts to default on foreign
debts. We already saw in the previous section how governments might try to preempt secondary
markets by moving ﬁrst and deciding enforcement before markets have had a chance to react. In
this section, we allow governments to use additional policy tools to ‘ﬁght’ against the market.
Again, we focus on the D-C World.
We start with an obvious observation: if Debtor’s government could open and close secondary
markets at will, it would have a time-varying perspective on what to do with this power. Today,
the government would be willing to take any action to ensure that the secondary market opens.
But Tomorrow, the same government would be willing to take any action to ensure that this
market closes. To the extent that Today’s government is unable to fully constraint Tomorrow’s
one, secondary markets will be subject to government interventions designed to avoid debtors
repurchasing their debts from creditors.
If these interventions are successful, even if only in part, sovereign risk will affect consumption
and welfare. Consider, for instance, the case in which Debtor’s government can tax trades in
the secondary market and/or exclude some debtors from participating in it. In such a situation,
sovereign risk would have similar effects to those analyzed in Examples 4 and 5, in which we
allowed for ad valorem transaction costs and limited participation.35 Consider also the case in
which the government can coordinate debtors and alleviate the prisoner’s dilemma problem that
the country faces. In this case, sovereign risk would have effects that parallel those analyzed in
Example 6, where we allowed for large agents.
It should not be surprising that government interventions in the secondary market produce
similar effects than the market imperfections we have already analyzed. After all, these interven-
tions are designed to put sand on the wheels of these markets. An interesting and new issue that
arises here relates to whether governments have in fact incentives to intervene. The next example
explores this issue.
EXAMPLE 13 (D-C World with Two Goods): All assumptions are as in the D-C World, except
that there are two goods: dates and coconuts. Debtor’s endowments consist only of dates, while
Creditor’s consist only of coconuts. Redeﬁne cit as the following consumption aggregator cit D
35The only difference, of course, is that government-induced transaction costs and/or limited participation would affect








(with ￿ > 1) for all i 2 IW and t D 0;1; where cD;it and cC;it
are the consumptions of dates and coconuts, respectively, of consumer i in date t.
In this version of the D-C World there are gains from commodity trade. Debtor payments
(of dates) to creditors Tomorrow might correspond to two different motives: repurchasing debts
in the secondary market and/or buying coconuts for consumption. In the equilibrium with full
enforcement, all debtors and creditors consume .y ￿ "/=2 dates and .y C "/=2 coconuts Today;
and .y C "/=2 dates and .y ￿ "/=2 coconuts Tomorrow. To do this, each region gives the other
one half of its production in each period.
Assume the government can impose capital controls Tomorrow. By capital controls, we mean
that the government can restrict international payments by debtors. For simplicity, assume that
capital controls are either zero or prohibitive. If Debtor’s government could discriminate between
payments according to the transaction, it would do so. For instance, consider the extreme case in
which Debtor’s government can perfectly discriminate. Then, it would forbid payments intended
to repurchase debts, but would not restrict payments intended to purchase coconuts. In this
extreme case, sovereign risk destroys all foreign asset trade and everybody is worse off.36
If Debtor’s government cannot perfectly discriminate between payments according to the type
of transaction, it might not be willing to impose capital controls. For instance, consider the other
extreme case in which Debtor’s government cannot discriminate at all. In this case, it will choose
not to impose capital controls as long as:















That is, capital controls are imposed only if the foreign debt is high, i.e. large "; and the gains
from trade are low, i.e. small ￿. Only in this case do the gains from default exceed the losses
from trade disruptions.37
An interesting aspect of this example is the connection between goods trade and default. The
notion that fear of trade disruptions might induce countries to repay their debts is an old one.
The previous literature, which assumed that secondary markets do not exist, viewed these trade
disruptions as the result of retaliation by creditors in the event of default. Allowing for secondary
markets provides a novel perspective on these trade disruptions as a by-product of capital controls
imposed by defaulting debtors.38
The main conclusion of this section is that, if governments have policy instruments that enable
them to interfere with the working of secondary markets, the negative effects of sovereign risk on
international asset trade may resurface. Whether they do so or not will depend on the additional
effects of the particular instruments considered. Moreover, such government intervention may
result in sovereign risk having other, seemingly unrelated, negative effects. While in the case of
36Of course, this would also be the case if secondary markets closed down for exogenous reasons before Tomorrow’s
endowments are realized.
37Note that in this example capital controls play a very different role than in the previous literature. Here capital con-
trols are used ex-post to avoid repayment to foreigners and have negative ex-ante effects. In Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001), Fernández-Arias and Lombardo (2002), Tirole (2003), Kehoe and Perri (2004), Broner and Ventura (2005), Jeske
(2006), and Wright (2006) capital controls are used ex-ante to avoid overborrowing and thus have positive ex-ante effects.
In addition, here capital controls are intended to keep domestic residents from purchasing domestic assets, while in cases
of capital ﬂight (e.g. Eaton, 1987) capital controls are intended to keep domestic residents from purchasing foreign assets.
38Rose (2005) and Martinez and Sandleris (2007) show that trade decreases around periods of default. They also
ﬁnd that the decrease in trade is not greater vis a vis creditor countries. This, although arguably inconsistent with the
interpretation of drops in trade as punishments, is consistent with our interpretation.30 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
Example (11) in the previous section sovereign risk resulted in reduced domestic asset trade, in
the case of Example (13) sovereign risk results in reduced international goods trade.
IV. Discussion and implications
Conventional wisdom views the problem of sovereign risk solely as one of insufﬁcient penal-
ties. Foreign creditors do not have the option of selling their debts in secondary markets and,
hence, can only be repaid if the government enforces foreign debts. The theory developed here
presentsanunconventionalviewofsovereignrisksolelyasoneofmissingorimperfectsecondary
markets. Foreign creditors cannot impose penalties and therefore the government never enforces
foreign debts. As a result, foreign creditors can only be repaid by selling their debts in secondary
markets.
Both of these views provide useful but incomplete theoretical benchmarks. The next step in
this line of research is to integrate default penalties and secondary markets in a single frame-
work. In such a framework, foreign creditors must choose between selling their debts to the
market, perhaps at a discount, or instead holding them until maturity. In ‘normal times,’ foreign
creditors are conﬁdent that the threat of imposing penalties is sufﬁcient to induce the country to
pay back its debts. Therefore, they quietly hold their debts until maturity. Once in a while, this
conﬁdence wavers and a ‘crisis’ starts. Foreign creditors go to the secondary markets and try to
sell their debts. The government, which also understands that default penalties are insufﬁcient,
tries to prevent the private sector from going to the secondary market and repurchasing foreign
debts. A struggle ensues in which foreign creditors, the private sector, and the government all
participate. If enough trading takes place before maturity, the government no longer gains much
from defaulting on foreign debts and ends up enforcing them. Default has been averted. If not
enough trading takes place before maturity, the government still has sizable gains from defaulting
on foreign debts and decides not to enforce them. Default takes place and the debt renegotiation
phase starts.
What would be the main predictions of such an integrated framework? Of course, we cannot
provide a detailed answer to this question yet. Still, we are conﬁdent that these predictions would
include the following:
￿ Trading volume should increase and gross international investment positions should de-
crease during crises as foreign creditors sell their debts to the private sector. This pre-
diction is consistent with the ﬁndings of Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Sergio L. Schmukler, and
Neeltje Van Horen (2008) and Broner, et al. (2009). The former show that trading volume
in emerging markets increases during crises, despite the fact that trading costs (i.e. bid-ask
spreads) also increase.39 The latter show that during crises, while gross capital inﬂows
fall sharply, gross capital outﬂows do not increase and even fall slightly. Although a more
conclusive test of our mechanism would require higher frequency data on the nationality
of buyers and sellers for particular assets, such data is not available.
￿ Expected returns on the country’s assets should increase during crises more than can be
accounted for by risk aversion. This is because the segment of the demand for the coun-
try’s assets that values them the most during normal times, namely foreigners, leaves the
market. Broner, Guido Lorenzoni, and Sergio Schmukler (2003) ﬁnd that, consistent with
this prediction, excess returns on emerging-market sovereign bonds are close to zero during
normal times and very high during crises.
39This evidence refers to stock markets, for which the role of governments as enforcers might seem less relevant than
for bonds. However, even in the case of stocks there are policies associated with investor protection and product and
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￿ Defaults should be less common on assets that are traded in secondary markets. This is
consistent with evidence provided by Michael Tomz (2007, p. 210). He ﬁnds that emerging
markets that borrowed via both bank loans and bonds defaulted substantially more often
on the former than on the latter. In addition, Andrea Pescatori and Amadou N. Sy (2007)
show that defaults were more common when emerging markets borrowed via syndicated
bank loans (1970’s and 1980’s) than when they borrowed via bonds (1990’s and 2000’s),
even though the incidence of debt-servicing difﬁculties was similar in both periods.
￿ When default takes place, governments should ﬁnd it difﬁcult to discriminate between do-
mestic and foreign creditors. This prediction is consistent with the ﬁndings of Federico
Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (2007). They analyze a large sample of recent sov-
ereign defaults and ﬁnd that, overall, foreign creditors do not appear to have been treated
differently from domestic ones.40 Moreover, this difﬁculty to discriminate establishes a
potential link between defaults and disruptions in domestic ﬁnancial markets. This is con-
sistent with the evidence that sovereign defaults are often associated with banking crises
and signiﬁcant reductions in credit to the private sector (see International Monetary Fund,
2002, and Carlos Arteta and Galina Hale, 2008).
As this tentative list shows, the introduction of secondary markets into the theory of sovereign
risk might substantially enhance its ability to explain the behavior of markets and governments
around debt crises. This will, no doubt, help improve the design of institutions and policies to
cope with the important problem of sovereign risk.
40Interestingly, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007) identify larger haircuts for foreign creditors in only two cases
of recent sovereign defaults. In at least one of them, Ukraine, the government imposed severe capital controls that
presumably affected the workings of secondary markets.32 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
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